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Abstract—Self-Managed Cells (SMCs) define an infrastruc-
ture for building ubiquitous computing applications. An SMC
consists of an autonomous administrative domain based on a
policy-driven feedback control-loop. SMCs are able to interact
with each other and compose with other SMCs to form larger
autonomous components. In this paper we present a formal
specification of an SMC’s behaviour for the analysis and
verification of its operation in collaborations of SMCs. These
collaborations typically involve SMCs originated from different
administrative authorities, and the definition of a formal model
has helped us to verify the correctness of their operation when
SMCs are composed or federated.
Keywords-policy-based management; self-managed cells; in-
teractions; model-checking;
I. INTRODUCTION
Management in complex pervasive environments cannot
rely on human intervention, and systems must be self-
managing with local decision making and feedback control
to enable seamless adaptation. We have introduced the
concept of a Self-Managed Cell (SMC) as a pattern for
building ubiquitous computing applications [1]. An SMC
implements a policy-driven feedback control-loop that deter-
mines which management and reconfiguration actions should
be performed in response to events of interest such as device
failures or context changes. Autonomous SMCs must be able
to interact with each other in complex ways, federate or
compose into larger structures. Systems such as body-area
networks for monitoring a patient’s health must continuously
adapt to changes in their environment or in their usage
requirements. These may comprise “smart sensors” and
diagnosis devices, but body-area network SMCs may also
interact with a number of other peer SMCs such as the SMC
running on the PDA of a doctor, or the SMC controlling
the room in which the wearer is present. SMC interactions
comprise the invocation of actions from one SMC on another
but also exchanges of events and policies between SMCs.
In this paper we present a formal specification of the
overall SMC behaviour and its analysis in collaborations
across SMCs, in which consistent policy deployment is
crucial. When these SMCs are federated, inconsistencies
may prevent them from operating as originally expected.
The definition of a formal model assists in the design of
SMC collaborations and allows us to verify the correctness
of anticipated SMC interactions before these interactions are
implemented and policies are deployed in physical devices
(e.g. PDAs, mobile phones, sensors). We show how our
formal model is used to automatically type-check policies
(matching the policy events and operations with the func-
tionality provided by the SMCs involved) and verify the
consistency of collaborations, allowing us to identify con-
flicting or inconsistent policy deployment across distributed
SMCs.
We chose the Alloy Analyzer [2] as the platform for this
formal specification as it allows us to declaratively express
complex structural constraints and behavior in SMC inter-
actions. Defining a formal specification for Self-Managed
Cells in Alloy allows us to: (1) formally capture the static
and dynamic aspects of the structure and behaviour of the
SMC interactions; (2) automatically verify the consistency
of SMC collaborations; and (3) simulate SMC behaviour in
complex interactions thus increasing our confidence in the
correctness of a given model.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
an overview of the SMC architecture. Section 3 briefly
describes our formalisation of Self-Managed Cells, and
Section 4 shows how this model can be used to automatically
type-check and verify the consistency of collaborations of
SMCs. Section 5 presents our concluding remarks.
II. SELF-MANAGED CELLS AND THEIR INTERACTIONS
An SMC forms an autonomous administrative domain
that consists of both hardware and software components. A
typical set-up representing a patient’s body-area network we
use for healthcare monitoring comprises a Gumstix1 device
hosting management services that controls several sensors
(e.g., heart-rate, temperature, acceleration) hosted on BSNs
(Body Sensor Nodes)2 as well as other devices such as
diagnostic devices hosted on PDAs or other Gumstix.
An SMC [1] comprises a dynamic set of management
services integrated through a publish/subscribe event bus.
The SMC relies on a policy service3, including both obli-
gation and authorisation policies. Policies can be dynami-
cally added, removed, enabled and disabled to change the
behaviour of an SMC without interrupting its functioning.
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the vicinity of the SMC, such as sensors and other SMCs,
and is responsible for managing the SMC’s membership,
to distinguish transient failures from permanent departures
from the SMC (e.g., device out of range or switched off).
However, to realise larger applications SMCs must be able
to interact with each other in complex ways. We use the
concept of roles to facilitate these interactions, where roles
are placeholders for remote SMCs discovered at run-time.
Roles can be thought of as typed-domains in a hierarchical
domain structure that each SMC maintains to manage its
resources. A remote SMC is assigned to a role in another
SMC if it fulfills the requirements for that role i.e., if it
provides the operations required by that domain. Once an
SMC is assigned to a role, policies previously associated
with a role (i.e., having that role as subject or target) will
then apply to SMCs assigned to it. This allows us to specify
policies governing the interactions with an SMC before that
SMC is discovered [3].
III. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF SELF-MANAGED CELLS
Models written in Alloy [2] can be automatically checked
for correctness using its analyser, and a visualiser can also
be used to display example (or counter-example) structures
graphically. Analysis in Alloy is performed over restricted
scopes and the user controls the number of objects to be
used (the user-specified scope makes the problem finite and
thus reducible to a boolean formula). This is based on the
small scope hypothesis, that for any flawed design a counter-
example should be found by an exhaustive search of a
comparatively small, bounded scope.
The structure of an Alloy model is defined through a set of
signatures. The main component in our model is the SMC,
represented by the signature SelfManagedCell below.
1 abstract sig SelfManagedCell
2 {
3 provides: some Interface,
4 requires: some Role,
5 obligations: set Obligation,
6 authorisations: set Authorisation
7 }
In the declaration of a signature body we can define a
number of relations, which can be thought of as fields of an
object in the OO paradigm. The SelfManagedCell signature
specifies four relations. The first two, provides and requires,
define respectively which interfaces an SMC is able to offer
to remote SMCs and which roles an SMC requires to be ful-
filled (by remote SMCs). The other two relations, obligations
and authorisations, define the policies an SMC is enforcing.
SelfManagedCell is an abstract signature, meaning it can
be extended to define a specialized component in our model
(e.g. DoctorSMC, PatientSMC, SensorSMC would all extend
the base SelfManagedCell signature).
An Interface defines the operations (methods that can be
invoked), events (which can be published externally) and
notifications (which are external events of which the SMC
can be notified) supported by that interface, as described
in [3]. It is defined by the signature below.
1 sig Interface
2 {
3 operations: set Operation,
4 events: set Event,
5 notifications: set Notification
6 }
A Role behaves as a placeholder for remote SMCs, which
can have their interfaces assigned to it. The complete model
is too large to be presented here but is available online4.
SMCs enforce two types of policies: obligations, which
cater for the adaptive behaviour of SMCs, and specify what
management actions (or operations) subjects must perform
on targets in response to events; and authorisations, which
are access control rules that specify what actions subjects
are permitted (positive authorisation) or forbidden (negative
authorisation) to perform on a target. The subjects and the
targets are roles within the context of the SMC in which the
policy is specified.
The ConcreteObligation signature extends Obligation and
defines the subject and target roles, and the event that
triggers the policy and action to be invoked.
1 sig ConcreteObligation extends Obligation
2 {
3 subject: one Role,
4 event: one Event,
5 action: one Operation,
6 target: one Role
7 }
Similarly, the signature ConcreteAuthorisation defines a
subject role, a target role, an action and the modality of the
policy (which can be either positive or negative).
1 sig ConcreteAuthorisation extends Authorisation
2 {
3 modality: one Modality,
4 subject: one Role,
5 action: one Operation,
6 target: one Role
7 }
The behaviour of an Alloy model is defined through a set
of predicates, which in our case represent the elementary
behaviour of SMCs, such as the discovery and departure of
SMCs, assignment and de-assignment of SMCs (interfaces)
to/from SMC roles, and loading and unloading of policies.
A common technique to represent dynamic behaviour in
Alloy is to show how the “state” of the system before
the operation differs from the “state” after the operation,
i.e. what properties hold before and what properties hold
after (pre and post conditions). The typical way of doing so
is to have an additional signature that represents the entire
4http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/∼aschaeff/alloy/policy-model.zip
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Figure 1. A valid configuration generated in Alloy (all active obligations have a corresponding active authorisation).
system being modelled. Then, for each operation we want
to model, we define a predicate, which takes as arguments a
system S and a system S’, and show how S differs from S’
in this predicate. This corresponds to showing the operation
happened in S then resulting in S’.
We encoded this notion of “state” of an interaction in an
additional signature (not shown here), named Configuration.
An instance of Configuration thus represents the interaction
between SMCs at a given time point, which is defined by the
current set of participants in this interaction, the assignments
of participants (represented by their provided interfaces) to
roles, the policies that are exchanged (loaded) between the
SMCs and, among those, the policies that are currently active
in each of the participating SMCs.
IV. MODEL-CHECKING AND POLICY ANALYSIS
We use the Alloy Analyzer to automatically verify the
consistency of specific SMC collaborations. In particular
we can verify the role assignments when establishing a
collaboration, and verify inconsistent policy deployment
across SMCs, where obligation policies do not always have
a corresponding authorisation policy.
Consider the configuration illustrated in Figure 1. The
DoctorSMC has an obligation policy Obl, which has Doctor
and Patient as the respective subject and target of the policy,
is triggered by the event highHR, to perform the startECG
action. Note that Doctor and Patient are roles required by
the DoctorSMC. On the other hand, the PatientSMC has an
authorisation policy Aut, which defines Doctor and Patient
as the subject and target of the policy respectively. This is
a positive authorisation (labelled “modality: Positive”) that
permits the execution of the startECG action. Here Doctor
and Patient are roles required by the PatientSMC.
In terms of role assignments, the DoctorSMC provides
Interface2, which is assigned to the local role Doctor.
This is a local assignment, where the role Doctor is also
the subject role of the obligation policy enforced by this
SMC. In this example, the same interface is exported to be
seen by the patient and assigned to the Doctor role in the
remote PatientSMC (where Doctor is the subject role of the
authorisation policy enforced by that SMC). Similarly, the
PatientSMC provides Interface0, which is assigned to the
local role Patient and then also exported and assigned to
the Patient role required by the remote DoctorSMC (where
Patient is the target role of the obligation policy enforced
by that SMC).
Type-checking is required for policy activation, as the
SMCs (i.e. their interfaces) assigned to a role must provide
the functionality expected by the policies written in terms
of that role. Note that in Figure 1, Interface2 (assigned to
the subject of the obligation) provides the event highHR
(required to trigger the obligation policy), and Interface0
(assigned to the target of the authorisation) provides action
startECG (which is the action to be allowed execution by
the authorisation policy). Moreover, each obligation has a
corresponding authorisation, which allows the action spec-
ified by the obligation to be executed. Figure 2 illustrates
the predicate to determine whether all obligations have a
matching positive authorisation policy. It states that for all
SMCs and for all obligations, if one SMC has this policy,
then there must be some positive authorisation which is
enforced by another SMC and specifies the same action as in
the obligation, and which has the same interfaces assigned
to the subject and target roles in both policies.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered several alternatives for the for-
mal specification of an SMC’s behaviour including pi-
calculus [4], ambient calculus [5], channel ambient calcu-
lus [6] and others (which model computation operationally).
In contrast, the declarative specification style used by Alloy
was simpler to use and the associated tool set offered rapid
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1 all conf: Configuration, smc1,smc2: conf.participants, obl: (conf.active & ConcreteObligation)
2 {
3 (obl in (smc1.obligations + smc1.(conf.loading)))
4 ⇒ some aut: (conf.active & ConcreteAuthorisation)
5 {
6 (aut in (smc2.authorisations + smc2.(conf.loading)))
7 and (aut.modality in Positive)
8 and (obl.action == aut.action)
9 and ((obl.subject).∼(conf.assignment) == (aut.subject).∼(conf.assignment))
10 and ((obl.target).∼(conf.assignment) == (aut.target).∼(conf.assignment))
11 }
12 }
Figure 2. Determining whether all obligations have a matching authorisation policy (consistent policy deployment).
feedback on the model specification. Its visualiser provides
a intuitive way of making sense of the solutions, which has
enabled us to rapidly fine tune the specification and uncover
omissions from the informal models developed earlier.
Several studies have looked at the (conflict) analysis of
policies in various forms [7], [8], [9], [10], some of it based
on model-checking techniques. In contrast to these studies
our focus is not on the ability to detect policy conflicts, but to
unambiguously specify the desired behaviour of interacting
Self-Managed Cells and then verify if these SMCs are able
to enforce their policies (type-checking events/operations to
interfaces, all obligations are authorised, etc). This allows
us to analyse SMC behaviour when interactions across
several cells occur. Thus we can model policy-based SMC
interactions and verify the correctness of these interactions
before its actual implementation and deployment in physical
devices.
We can further check whether in given circumstances,
authorisations permit the execution of actions that would
threaten the integrity of the SMC or whether failure or
departure of devices leaves the SMC in a state where it is
no longer able to fulfill its primary functions. This is par-
ticularly important when developing body area networks for
health monitoring as the integrity of the sensor configuration
influences the medical interpretation of the physiological
parameters collected. More traditional types of analysis, such
as detecting policy conflicts in the form of modality or
application specific conflicts can also be performed.
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